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INNOCENCE AND SUICIDE 
George 1. Mavrodes 
In this paper I examine one line of argument against the claim that (some) suicide 
may be morally legitimate. This argument appeals to a putative moral principle 
that it is never licit to assault an innocent human life. I consider some related argu-
ments in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and I explore two possible senses of "im10-
cent." I argue that in one sense the putative moral principle is very implausible, 
and in neither sense is it true that all suicides assault an innocent life. So this line 
of argument fails to establish the desired universal prohibition of suicide. 
On 7 November, 1996, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the Catholic 
Archbishop of Chicago, wrote an open letter to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
He concluded that letter by saying, "I urge the Court not to create any 
right to assisted suicide.'" Bernardin's letter provides a refreshing con-
trast to much of the contemporary discussion of this topic. In recent dis-
cussions, several different lines of argument have been deployed 
against the morality, legitimacy, desirability, etc., of physician-assisted 
suicide (PAS). Most of these arguments appeal to special premisses 
about the practice of medicine, the role of physicians in society, the doc-
tor-patient relationship, and even to the provisions of the Hippocratic 
Oath.' Bernardin, in contrast, puts forward an argument which (for bet-
ter or worse) applies directly to the morality of suicide, regardless of 
who assists it or whether it is assisted at all. It is this line of argument 
which 1 want to explore in this paper. 
Bernardin states the core of his argument twice in the letter, in two 
succinct sentences. First, "Our legal and ethical tradition has held con-
sistently that suicide, assisted-suicide and euthanasia are wrong because 
they involve a direct attack on innocent life." And again, "There can be 
no such thing as a 'right to assisted-suicide' because there can be no 
legal and moral order which tolerates the killing of innocent human life, 
even if the agent of death is self-administered." 
Bernardin's argument is remarkably simple. It can represented in 
terms of two premisses and a conclusion. The first premiss is a (puta-
tive) moral principle. The second premiss is a special claim about what 
a suicide amounts to. And the conclusion states the moral impermissi-
bility of any suicide. 
1. It is morally wrong to assault any innocent life (to take the life of 
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any innocent person, etc.) 
2. Every suicide is an assault on an innocent life. 
3. Therefore, every suicide is morally wrong.3 
Much of this paper is a critique of this argument. But 1 can begin by say-
ing that, in my judgment at least, this argument is logically valid. If 
there is a weakness or fault in it, that deficiency must lie in one, or both, 
of the premisses. 
The first premiss-what we might call the "principle" of Bernardin's 
argument-has an honorable lineage in Christian moral philosophy. It 
goes back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas, who concluded an argument 
of his own by saying, "There is, therefore, simply no justification for 
taking the life of an innocent person."" And this principle has often been 
appealed to by later writers, often in the context of defending an 
absolute prohibition against the deliberate killing of non-combatants in 
warfare.' 
It is clear, I think, that in this line of argument the notion of inno-
cence plays a crucial role. And I will argue later that the appeal to inno-
cence is highly problematic. But, simple as Bernardin's argument is, 
there is an even simpler argument which yields the same conclusion. 
And that argument makes no mention of innocence at all. We can learn 
something by comparing Bernardin's argument with this simpler one. 
4. All killing is morally wrong (it is divinely prohibited, etc.) 
5. Every suicide involves killing. 
6. Therefore, every suicide is wrong. 
This argument also has an honorable history, having been given a 
classic formulation by st. Augustine in The City of God: 
... how much greater reason have we to understand that a man 
may not kill himself, since in the commandment, "Thou shalt not 
kill," there is no limitation added nor any exception made in 
favour of anyone, and least of all in favour of him on whom the 
commandment is laid! ... so, then it remains that we understand 
that commandment simply of man. The commandment is, "Thou 
shalt not kill man;// therefore neither another nor yourself, for he 
who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.6 
The simplicity and power of this line of argument, an appeal to a 
divine commandment expressed in four short words, still commends 
itself to some Christian moralists. The contemporary Calvinist theolo-
gian John Bolt, for example, categorically rejects Dr. Jack Kevorkian and 
other advocates of PAS by saying, "Is the clarity of the law-'Thou shalt 
not kill' -not the absolutely necessary line of defense against all the 
myriad possibilities of abuse by advocates of 'good death'?//7 
And, like Bernardin's argument, the Augustinian argument is logical-
ly valid. So if it has any defect at all, that defect must lie in some pre-
mISS. 
Both of these simple arguments have curious relations to Thomas' 
own discussion of suicide-//ls it legitimate for somebody to kill him-
self?" -which is one of the eight articles which comprise his discussion of 
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homicide in generaLB The most obvious relation is that Thomas shares 
the conclusion of Bernardin and Augustine, saying flatly for himself that 
"suicide is completely wrong for three reasons."'! And, as 1 have already 
noted above, Thomas shares the "innocence principle" with Bernardin-
in fact, Bernardin may well have gotten it from Thomas. Thomas also, I 
think, shares a premiss with Augustine. At least, r do not imagine that 
Thomas would deny that a suicide involves the killing of a "man." And 
yet when Thomas comes to give his own three reasons for the claim that 
suicide is completely wrong neither Augustine's line of argument, nor 
Bernardin's, is among them.!O That strikes me as a suggestive fact. There 
is something to be considered there, perhaps something to be learned. 
Why does Thomas seem loath to make either of these simple argu-
ments his own? I suspect that it is because he believes that one of 
Augustine's premisses is false, and also that one of Bernardin's premiss-
es is false. Thomas does not share Augustine's apparent understanding 
of the divine commandment which prohibits homicide. So he does not 
share the first premiss, the moral principle, of Augustine's argument. 
On the other hand, he shares Bernardin's principle, but he does not 
share Bernardin's second premiss. He does not agree that (every) sui-
cide consists in an assault on an innocent life. And so Thomas could not, 
with a straight face, endorse either of these arguments and make use of 
them himself. But let us look at both of these cases in more detail. 
Thomas certainly knew the Augustinian argument. He quotes it, in 
fact, as the sed contra of his own article on suicide." But he does not 
seem eager to use it himself. He shares a conclusion with Augustine, 
and presumably he also shares Augustine's second premiss. But he 
does not share Augustine's reading of the commandment, and so he 
does not share Augustine's principle, his first premiss. 
Augustine calls attention to the fact that this injunction, one of the 
Ten Commandments, is unqualified. In fact, he stresses this lack of 
qualification as the key element in his interpretation of the command-
ment as a universal prohibition. The biblical text does not mention any 
exceptions-the divine command is not explicitly restricted to the killing 
of other people. So Augustine interprets it as prohibiting both the killing 
of other people and the killing of oneself. Thus, all suicide is divinely 
prohibited by a plain command of God. 
The Augustinian argument is straightforward enough, but it pro-
vokes an immediate objection, or at least a problem. True enough, the 
commandment is not explicitly restricted to what we might call "hetero-
cide," the killing of others. But neither is it explicitly restricted to homi-
cide, the killing of "man," the killing of humans. Man is not mentioned 
in the commandment at all. And so, would not Augustine's mode of 
interpretation invite a further extension, making the commandment pro-
hibit the killing of animals as well as of humans? For, after all, it says, 
Thou shalt not kill, period! 
Augustine was aware of this problem-probably it was already being 
raised by his own contemporaries! And so he devotes about a third of § 
20 to it. He argues that there are morally important differences between 
plants and animals on the one hand and humans on the other. Humans 
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have sensation and reason, while the lower forms are lacking in one or 
both of these. That seems to Augustine to be a morally important differ-
ence. So he thinks himself justified in restricting the scope of the com-
mandment to homicideY 
That reply, however, invites a still further quasi-Augustinian exercise, 
this time an exercise in restriction. Or so, at least, it seems to me. For 
there seems also to be a morally important distinction between killing 
someone else and killing oneself. In the one case we might suppose, 
ordinarily at least, that the victims do not wish to be killed and do not 
consent to it, while in the other case the "victims" do wish to be killed 
and, in fact, they actively undertake the project themselves. And so, 
using a quasi-Augustinian strategy, we might interpret the command-
ment as prohibiting heterocide but not suicide. I] 
Thomas would not want to make that particular exception, since he 
thinks that "suicide is completely wrong." But he certainly does want 
other exceptions, much more extensive than that one. Just a few pages 
before he came to the topic of suicide, Thomas had considered the ques-
tion, "Is it legitimate to kill sinners?" And he gives a plain answer to 
that question. 
Therefore if any man is dangerous to the community and is sub-
verting it by some sin, the treatment to be commended is his execu-
tion in order to preserve the common good, for a little leaven sours 
the whole lump. I' 
And in an earlier "Question" on warfare he had argued that the civil 
authorities, to whom the care of the community is committed, "lawfully 
use the sword of war to protect the commonweal from foreign attacks. illS 
So Thomas certainly does not think that all homicide is morally wrong, 
that it is divinely prohibited, or anything of the sort. He does not under-
stand the commandment to be as unqualified as it appears on the sur-
face. And so he could not simply endorse Augustine's reasoning.'" 
Thomas, of course, is not alone in this. The Catholic tradition general-
ly, though perhaps not unanimously, has accepted the moral legitimacy 
of just war and of judicial execution. And so have some other significant 
Christian traditions. I quoted John Bolt's appeal to the Augustinian line 
of argument against suicide. But Bolt's own tradition, Calvinism, has 
traditionally recognized roughly the same range of exceptions to the 
apparently categorical prohibition in the Decalogue. So, over the cen-
turies there have been millions of incidents of the intentional killing of a 
human being, killings which have been widely accepted by Christian 
moralists as morally legitimate necessities, albeit the somber necessities 
of a sinful and perverted world. By whatever stratagem, Christian 
thinkers have generally understood the commandment-those four sim-
ple monosyllables-as including these enormous loopholes. And so it is 
not just Thomas. No such moralist could consistently endorse 
Augustine's argument, however much he or she might approve of 
Augustine'S conclusion. 
Well, situations in which various thinkers agree on a conclusion, but do 
INNOCENCE AND SUICIDE 319 
not on agree on the arguments put forward to support it, are not all that 
uncommon in philosophy-and they are not unknown among Christian 
philosophers.17 Perhaps Augustine is just inclined to a more hard-nosed 
reading of biblical texts than are Thomas and much of the Christian tradi-
tion. Or is he? 
Maybe not. In the section from which I have quoted, Augustine 
hangs his whole case against suicide on the fact that "in the command-
ment, 'Thou shalt not kill,' there is no limitation added nor any excep-
tion made in favour of anyone, and least of all in favour of him on 
whom the commandment is laid!" Here Augustine is an uncompromis-
ing universalist in his reading of the Exodus text, and so he can give this 
section of his discussion the title, "That Christians have no authority for 
committing suicide in any circumstances whatever."ls There simply are no 
exceptions to the divine prohibition against the killing of human beings. 
In the very next section, however, a rather different tune is sung. 
"There are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, 
that men may not be put to death."19 So the Exodus command does have 
some exceptions after all! What exceptions? Well, the first ones which 
Augustine mentions are just those which we have already seen in 
Thomas and the majority of the later Christian tradition. 
They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or 
in conformity with His laws have represented in their persons the 
public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have 
put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated 
the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill."20 
And so here Augustine holds that there are divine commands-com-
mands with regard to warfare and law enforcement-which are excep-
tions to the prohibition of homicide.2l Thus he turns out to be not nearly 
so uncompromising as he first appeared to be in his universalistic read-
ing of the commandment in Exodus. 
There is a hermeneutic problem in Augustine's procedure here, one 
which we can mention briefly without exploring it in depth. One may 
be confronted with two commands which are incompatible, in the sense 
that it is not possible to satisfy both of them. In such a case, at least one 
of the commands must, willy-nilly, be violated, ignored, or something of 
the sort. But which one is to be ignored? To choose one for this role is 
to say that, in this case at least, the other one takes precedence. And to 
say that A is an exception to B is to say that A is the one which takes 
precedence. There are indeed Biblical cases of command incompatibili-
ties. But, for the most part anyway, neither of the conflicting commands 
is clearly marked in the text as the one which should be accorded prece-
dence. Augustine, in calling some of them exceptions, has made such a 
judgment. But it is not clear what the basis is for his particular choice.22 
Whatever his basis may be, Augustine clearly (in this section) opts for 
warfare and law enforcement as exceptions to "Thou shalt not kill." Are 
there other exceptions? Yes. Or so, at least, Augustine suspects, and he 
seems to be troubled by some of them. He mentions Abraham's readi-
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ness to kill his son, and Jephthah's actual killing of his daughter. 23 
Abraham's case is comparatively easy for Augustine. According to the 
biblical text, Abraham was obeying a special divine command. And 
Augustine thinks that it is an open question whether Jephthah may also 
have had a divine command for his action, though nothing is said of that 
in the biblical text. 
Closer to the question of suicide is the case of Samson, who killed 
himself along with his Philistine tormentors.'" And there was also the 
case of certain Christian women who had drowned themselves when 
they were facing an imminent threat of rape, and who were already 
being venerated in the church as holy martyrs." Augustine apparently 
feels himself bound to accept these particular actions as legitimate, or at 
least not to condemn them out of hand. And so he repeatedly appeals to 
the possibility that these people also were responding to "a special inti-
mation from God Himself," "secret instructions," and so on. 
Now, from the earliest days of Christianity right on down to the pre-
sent there have been Christians who have believed themselves to be the 
recipients of divine revelation, divine injunctions, divine instructions, 
etc. In fact, the idea of what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls "divine dis-
course," the idea of God's speaking to human beings, is so deeply 
embedded in the Christian view of the human situation that it cannot 
plausibly be excised from Christian thought.'" Christians, therefore, can-
not consistently deny the possibility that God has given some people 
"secret instructions" with respect to killing, perhaps including suicide. 
However, I would suppose that most Christians who have thought 
that their participation in warfare, law enforcement, etc., was consistent 
with their Christian commitment would not have claimed any special 
divine instruction on this matter. They are more likely to appeal to some 
general principles-just war theory, for example-to legitimate their par-
ticipation in killing despite the Exodus commandment. Augustine clear-
ly thinks that there are special divine commands which constitute 
exceptions to "thou shalt not kill," and he appears to think also that 
there are some special divine commands which legitimate (some cases 
of) suicide. Later on in this paper I shall consider the possibility that 
there are also some general considerations which have a similar effect. 
Well then, maybe there is no one, not even Augustine, who accepts 
the Augustinian argument. But could Thomas, at least, accept 
Bernardin's argument, with its appeal to innocence? In the discussion of 
homicide, Thomas asks, "Is it ever permissible to kill an innocent per-
son?" We have already seen his own reply: "There is, therefore, simply 
no justification for taking the life of an innocent person."27 This is the 
"innocence principle," the principle which Thomas shares with 
Bernardin. But Thomas does not share Bernardin's claim that every sui-
cide involves a "direct attack on innocent life." And so he could not, in 
good conscience, adopt Bernardin's line of argument for himself. In fact, 
he first introduces the innocence principle into the discussion of homi-
cide only in the article which follows the article on suicide, and his dis-
cussion of suicide does not mention innocence at all. 
I said that Thomas does not believe that every suicide assaults an 
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innocent life. There is clear evidence of that in the article on suicide. As 
usual in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas begins by citing several argu-
ments against the position which he wants to defend in the end. One of 
these counter-arguments goes as follows: 
He who holds public authority may legitimately kill malefactors. 
But sometimes he who holds such authority is himself a malefac-
tor. Such a person may, therefore, legitimately kill himself.28 
The conclusion of this argument is contradictory to Thomas' desired 
conclusion that "suicide is completely wrong." But the first premiss 
here is a claim for which Thomas himself had argued a few pages earli-
er, when he dealt with the question, "Is it legitimate to kill sinners?"29 
He does not now repudiate that claim. Neither does he say that the sec-
ond premiss is impossible, nor even that in fact there are no such cases. 
He makes no objection to either premiss. Instead, he has recourse to a 
rather special, and somewhat legalistic, principle-"nobody is a judge in 
his own case."30 And he goes on to add that a public official who finds 
himself in this circumstance "may, of course, hand himself over to the 
judgement of others." 
It appears, then, that Thomas had reasons-and in my judgment 
strong reasons-to steer clear of both Augustine's argument and 
Bernardin's argument. But is there any plausible way of salvaging 
something from these lines of argument? 
I think that we could not salvage the Augustinian line in its entirety, 
while maintaining a decent consistency, unless we abandon what has been a 
centuries-long majority tradition in Christian moralizing-the tradition 
which has legitimated (morally) a massive amount of violence, includ-
ing lethal violence, in warfare and law enforcement. I say that this has, 
for some time now, been the majority view. But, of course, it has not 
been the only view among Christians. There are also the radical pacifist 
traditions, and perhaps it would not be inconsistent for someone of that 
sort to espouse Augustine's argument against suicide. 
Curiously, Thomas himself comes close to an "Augustinian" reading 
of several biblical injunctions about violence and killing, but only if they 
are severely restricted in another way. For he understands them to be 
addressed to only a very small group of people, the Christian clergy.31 
There is still another possibility which, so far as I know, Thomas did not 
consider, but which belongs to some versions of Christian pacifism. 
And that is to construe the "pacifist" injunctions, not as general moral 
principles binding on everyone, but rather as special duties or obliga-
tions for Christians generally (and not merely for the clergy).32 At any 
rate, I will say no more here about these possible strategies. That is, I 
will construe the morality of suicide in terms of a general morality, and 
not as a special moral requirement for Christians or for the clergy. 
Could something be salvaged from Bernardin's line of argument. 
Well, I suppose that someone might say that the Thomas' sort of counter-
example-the non-innocent malefactor who wants to commit suicide--
will be a rare case. So perhaps the second premiss could be amended to 
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say that "almost all suicides assault an innocent life," and corresponding-
ly the conclusion would be that "almost all suicides are morally wrong." 
Such a emendation, however, might turn out to be rather significant 
in the debate over the morality of suicide. The range of legitimate cases 
may not be so small as one initially imagined, and it might include all 
the cases which some moralists would count as proper. But that will 
depend on how we construe the notion of innocence, and on what ratio-
nale we are willing to give for introducing innocence into the discussion 
of homicide in general and suicide in particular. Here, too, there is 
something to be learned from Thomas. 
There are few moralists-apparently not even Augustine himself-
who are willing to accept the major premiss which appears in 
Augustine's argument against suicide. But many moralists-including, 
I think, most Christians-feel some tug there. There is the feeling that 
the absolute and universal prohibition against killing is almost right, that 
it is a prima facie moral principle, or something of the sort. But there is 
also the conviction that it can't be the whole story, at least not in the pre-
sent corrupted state of the world. And so almost all moralizing about 
homicide, including Christian moralizing, labors uneasily over the pro-
ject of identifying and justifying the exceptions to the prima facie imper-
missibility of killing human beings. 
It is in trying to find a principle for those exceptions that the notion 
of innocence, and its contrast, is introduced by many Christian moral-
ists, including Thomas. For example, there are (according to them) 
morally legitimate reasons for engaging in warfare ("just cause"), and 
morally legitimate ways of fighting a war ("just means"). In prosecuting 
a war for a just cause it is morally permissible to kill some human 
beings-to kill them deliberately, either as an end or as a means of 
achieving some important end. But there are some other human beings 
whom it is never permissible to kill in warfare-never morally permissi-
ble, that is, to kill them deliberately either as ends or as means.33 What 
principle distinguishes these two classes of human beings? We hear 
repeatedly that it is innocence.34 Some people are not innocent, and it is 
morally legitimate to kill them.35 The others are innocent, and these peo-
ple enjoy the moral immunity-they cannot deliberately be killed within 
the bounds of morality. 
And now we hear another echo of that principle in Bernardin's letter, 
applied there to suicide rather than to warfare. The suicide deliberately 
assaults an innocent life, says Bernardin, and so suicide is wrong, not to 
be tolerated by any legal and moral order. 
But what, in this connection, is innocence? I think our initial inclina-
tion is probably to construe innocence in some "juridical" sense. We 
take its natural contrast to be the notion of guilt. The innocent person is 
one who is not guilty of any relevant crime or wrong-doing, one who is 
therefore not deserving of punishment, and so on. Some years ago, I 
discussed the claim of some just-war theorists that the innocence of non-
combatants conferred on them a special and absolute (moral) immunity. 
The deliberate killing of non-combatants was, on this view, always 
morally illegitimate. I assumed that innocence was the opposite of guilt, 
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and I argued that the guilty /innocent distinction did not match the com-
batant/non-combatant distinction which it was invoked to support.36 
These distinctions did not match, I said, in the sense that they did not 
identify the same groups of people, or anywhere near the same groups, 
within the circumstances of modern warfare. So even if we accepted the 
moral significance of the guilty /innocent distinction it would not pro-
vide the desired rationale for the immunity of non-combatants. 
I was initially inclined to level the same sort of criticism against 
Bernardin's argument. Of course, some suicides are those of innocent peo-
ple-or at any rate, people who are not notorious sinners or criminals. 
Bernardin's argument might apply to those cases. But not every suicide is 
of that sort. What would Bernardin say, for example, of the suicide of Judas 
Iscariot, as it is described in the Gospel of Matthew?37 Would Bernardin really 
say that when Judas took his own life he was taking an innocent life? If 
Judas counts as an innocent, then who would not be innocent? 
That criticism would not, of course, suffice to show that the suicide of 
Judas was morally OK. But it might show that Bernardin's reason against 
the legitimacy of suicide per se was weak, not sufficiently general. 
Now, in mounting these critiques I was, as I say, assuming that "inno-
cent" is itself a term of moral appraisal, the opposite of "guilty." 
Perhaps, however, that assumption was rash and unjustified. In a recent 
paper, Albert R. Jonsen has argued that such an assumption would 
indeed be incorrect, at least in thinking about Thomas. For, Jonsen says, 
"'innocent,' to a Latin speaker, meant not 'guiltless' but rather 'harm-
less."'3s And it was that comment which incited me to look again at 
Thomas' treatment of suicide and other forms of homicide. 
I've already noted that innocence is not mentioned in the article on 
suicide. But the principle to which people like Anscombe, Ford, and 
Bernardin seem to be alluding is stated explicitly in the immediately fol-
lowing article, where the question to be answered is "Is it ever permissi-
ble to kill an innocent person?" Thomas' argument in response to that 
question goes as follows: 
A man can be looked at in two ways-in isolation and in some con-
text. Now, considering man in isolation, it is not legitimate to kill any 
man. Every man, even the sinner, has a nature which God made, and 
which as such we are bound to love, whereas we violate it by killing 
him. It nevertheless remains true, as we have already seen, that sin 
corrodes the common good and so justifies the killing of the sinner, 
whereas the life of just men preserves and promotes the common 
good, since they constitute the bulk of the people. There is, therefore, 
simply no justification for taking the life of an innocent person." 
When Thomas says "as we have already seen" he is apparently refer-
ring to the argument of article 2, "Is it legitimate to kill sinners?" He 
there defends an affirmative answer to that question as follows: 
Every part is related to the whole precisely as imperfect to perfect, 
which is the reason why every part is naturally for the sake of the 
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whole. If, therefore, the well-being of the whole body demands the 
amputation of a limb, say in the case where one limb is gan-
grenous and threatens to infect the others, the treatment to be com-
mended is amputation. Now every individual person is as it were 
a part of the whole. Therefore if any man is dangerous to the com-
munity and is subverting it by some sin, the treatment to be com-
mended is his execution in order to preserve the common good, for 
a little leaven sours the whole lump. 40 
The way in which Thomas argues here certainly seems to me to lend 
strong support to Jonsen's claim about the Thomistic sense of "inno-
cence." Thomas does indeed think that human beings have something 
which makes any intentional killing of a human prima facie illicit. They 
have a special sort of nature, divinely created, which we are "bound to 
love," a nature which would be "violated" by anyone who killed a 
human being!! And sinners-"malefactors" as he sometimes calls 
them-have this nature just as much as anyone else. If there is to be any 
legitimate homicide, then, there must be a special justification for it, a 
justification for the particular case. And that justification must over-ride 
the prima facie moral barrier generated by the special divinely created 
nature of human beings. 
When Thomas looks for that justification, however, he does not seem 
to suggest that the sinner deserves to die, that execution is the appropri-
ate punishment for the evil things the sinner has done, that the sinner 
has forfeited the right to life, etc. Notions such as guilt, blame, desert, 
and punishment do not seem to come into Thomas' arguments here at 
all. All of the work is done by the idea of the common good, of protect-
ing the community against the damage and loss which the malefactor 
may cause. And it is because' just men preserve and promote the com-
mon good that there is no justification for taking their "innocent" lives. 
We can get some further feel for Jonsen's contrast between "blame-
less" and "harmless" by noticing two divergent analogies which have 
been used. Elizabeth Anscombe, defending the immunity of non-com-
batants, condemned the shedding of innocent blood by observing that 
"no man may be punished except for his own crime." When Thomas, 
however, wants to illustrate his own position he turns to a quite differ-
ent analogy. "If, therefore, the well-being of the whole body demands 
the amputation of a limb, say in the case where one limb is gangrenous 
and threatens to infect the others, the treatment to be commended is 
amputation." One analogy invites us to think of crime; the other asks us 
to think of sickness. The first analogy proposes punishment as an 
appropriate response; the second commends the sacrifice of a part in the 
interest of the whole. Those two invitations appeal, it seems to me, to 
quite different sorts of judgment. 
In June 1997, the U.s. Supreme Court refused to invalidate a Kansas 
law which provides that sex offenders who have completed their sen-
tences may be involuntarily confined for a further indefinite period on a 
finding that they are dangerous to themselves or others, being "likely" 
to commit future "predatory acts of violence." The procedure envi-
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sioned in this law strikes some people as morally problematic, to say the 
least. The original sentence, they feel, might be morally justified because 
it is imposed as a punishment for some criminal act which was actually 
done. But the further confinement, after the full sentence has been 
served, is imposed not for what has been done but to forestall what 
might be done in the future. And it is that latter operation which strikes 
them as morally illicit. "The American justice system is based on pun-
ishment for what people actually do, rather than on detaining them for 
what they might do."42 
Anscombe might well agree with this latter judgment against the 
Court, and against the Kansas law, at least if she means "his own crime" 
to be the crime which a man has actually committed. But Thomas, I 
think, would have no problem with the Kansas law, or at least with its 
provision for further confinement. For that provision seems to have just 
the rationale which Thomas gives for the execution of malefactors-that 
of preventing them from damaging the common good. In fact, Thomas 
might well think that it is the other element in most American criminal 
jurisprudence, that of punishment for crimes already committed, which 
is unjustified. Of course, a violent pedophile may have already done 
serious damage to the common good by his acts. But that damage can-
not be repaired by now confining that man in prison, nor even by exe-
cuting him. And so what would justify the public authority in thus vio-
lating the divinely created nature which the pedophile, despite his sins, 
shares with all other humans? Thomas would surely say that we can 
legitimately prevent what such a man might do in the future, and that is 
a rationale for acting. But he might add that we cannot undo what that 
man did in the past, and so what he did in the past does not itself pro-
vide us with a rationale for acting against him. 
I'm now inclined, therefore, to think that there may be two substan-
tially different ideas in use by various authors who refer to innocence in 
discussions of this sort. Innocence, in one of these senses finds its close 
affinities and contrasts in notions such as guilt, desert, punishment, 
reward, etc. (I will refer to this as the "juridical" sense.) In the other 
sense, however, the close affinities and contrasts are with harm, danger, 
prevention, preservation, etc. (1 will refer to this as the "foreboding" 
sense.) Thomas really does seem to be working (at least most of the 
time) with this second sense. And what of other writers? Well, 
Anscombe's use of the crime and punishment analogy suggests the 
juridical sense for her. And what about Bernardin? I don't know. 
However that may be, perhaps we ourselves can profitably reflect a lit-
tle more on the ramifications of the Thomistic sense (or what I now take 
to be that sense), both in Thomas' own arguments and also more general-
ly. Thomas' treatment of the morality of homicide in general depends 
largely on the inter-action of two elements. One is a deontological claim 
about the general moral inviolability of human life, an inviolability which 
derives from the fact that human beings have a special nature, divinely 
created, a nature which we are morally bound to honor and love. And 
whoever kills a human being "violates" that special nature. 
Thomas does not here say just what features of human nature are 
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especially relevant to this moral demand. And so, of course, he does not 
explain just why these relevant features do demand our honor and love. 
But it seems pretty clear that he does not attempt to ground this demand 
on some consideration of the consequences of satisfying (or violating) 
this moral ideal. So here is a moral demand which seems to be indepen-
dent of the consequences of the act in question. The best I can make of it 
is that here a certain course of action and forbearance is judged to be 
somehow "fitting." That pattern of life and action coheres with some 
deep feature of reality-it matches something which is profound in the 
structure of the world-so that people who live in that way would bring 
themselves into harmony with reality. Maybe here some notion akin to 
Beauty is as important as Goodness. 
The other principal element in the Thomist morality of homicide is a 
teleological-indeed, a utilitarian-principle. The function of this prin-
ciple is to provide a rationale for over-riding the deontological barrier in 
special cases. It accounts for the exceptions. Perhaps Thomas would say 
that if the world were perfect there would be no cases of that sort-
beauty and goodness would match everywhere. But at some level the 
actual world is spoiled, distorted, corrupted by sin. And so somewhere 
the beauty of loving and honoring human nature must give way to the 
necessity of protecting some other important goods. In a second-best 
world we must sometimes act in a second-best way. Thomas'teleologi-
cal principle is a principle for the second-best, a rationale for the excep-
tions. So the deontological element is what we might call Thomas' "base 
line" morality on this topic, and the teleological element is the principle 
for (perhaps sorrowfully) departing from that base-line.H 
Construing innocence in this way, as being something like harmless 
rather than guiltless, provides an attractive rationale for the Thomistic 
over-rider. I suppose that Thomas, looking at the world as it actually is 
(rather than as an ideal), thought that the social order could not survive 
without the violence of law enforcement and warfare. Without those 
defenses the settled order of society, within which there is a certain 
flourishing of human life, would be destroyed by external aggression 
and internal criminality. Something like the Hobbesian nightmare in 
which life which is "nasty, brutish, and short" would be indeed the wak-
ing reality. The civil order is a great good, worthy of defense. And so it 
might be thought that there is a rationale for over-riding the prima facie 
illegitimacy of killing. 
But given that there can be such an over-rider, what would be the 
rationale for thinking that nothing other than warfare and law enforce-
ment qualify? Thomas' version of the teleological principle here is 
remarkable because of the extremely narrow base on which it rests. It 
validates exceptions to the deontological demand, exceptions in the ser-
vice of some value. But Thomas here seems to recognize no locus of 
value other than in the political community. One would not need to 
deny that there is such a thing as the good of the community in order to 
recognize that there may also be some other goods-perhaps, e.g., the 
good of individuals. But, in this discussion at least, Thomas seems to 
have no inclination at all in that direction. "Every part," he says, "is nat-
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mally for the sake of the whole." And, "every individual person is as it 
were a part of the whole."44 Within that view of the hierarchy of the 
world, its teleological ordering, there would indeed seem to be no locus 
for a value, a significant good, other than in the good of the community. 
That Thomas really is operating here with this extremely narrow base 
for the relevant teleological value is confirmed by the way in which he 
treats the legitimacy of killing in self-defense. There he says that 
It remains nevertheless that it is not legitimate for a man actually to 
intend to kill another in self-defense, since the taking of life is 
reserved to the public authorities acting for the common good, as 
we have seen. Killing in self- defense in this sort of way is restrict-
ed to somebody who has the public authority to do so; such a man 
may indeed intend to kill a man in self-defense but he does so for 
the general good.45 
So Thomas argues here that one can legitimately kill in self-defense, but 
only if that is done to protect the general good. Protecting one's own indi-
vidual good is not a sufficient justification for lethal self-defense. And 
only the "public authorities" have the responsibility of providing for the 
defense of the general good. So a private citizen, acting on his own, could 
not legitimately kill in self-defense, even to protect the common good. 
Nevertheless, Thomas does want to maintain the legitimacy of some 
private self-defense. "Even the person who kills another in defense of 
his own life will, therefore, not be guilty of homicide."46 But he cannot 
defend this conclusion on the basis of a value to be preserved, because 
he recognizes no value except in the common good. So he makes a 
rather awkward and unpersuasive appeal to the principle of double 
effect, arguing that the legitimate private self-defender does not really 
intend the death of the assailant. He intends only to defend himselfY 
The view about the locus of value which is expressed throughout the 
whole discussion of homicide is so radically narrow that the Blackfriar 
translators of the Summa have included a footnote here referring to "the 
apparent totalitarianism of this principle," and they suggest that 
Thomas qualifies it in other places. In particular, they say that Thomas 
also recognizes (elsewhere) that individuals are not hierarchically 
"ordered" to the political society in every respect, and that he also recog-
nizes that human society on earth is itself "subordinated to the goal of 
eternal life in heaven."4k Those qualifications seem to me to be emi-
nently desirable, especially on the basis of a Christian understanding of 
human life and destiny. But what happens to the argument from inno-
cence, especially with respect to suicide, if we take seriously that sort of 
qualification, and thus perhaps acknowledge a good which is other than 
the good of the political community? 
There is an interesting and suggestive paper by Lisa Sowle Cahill 
which explores that question."" Cahill argues that (some) suicide can be 
justified by an appeal to the "principle of totality." She quotes from a 
speech of Pope Pius XII in which he says that lithe whole is a determin-
ing factor for the part and can dispose of it in its own interest," and that 
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therefore "the patient can allow the individual parts to be destroyed or 
mutilated when and to the extent necessary for the good of his being as 
a whole."50 In this, of course, we can hear an echo of Thomas' own anal-
ogy of the gangrenous limb. 
Cahill goes on to suggest that a Christian, at least, might be rather 
suspicious of thinking that the totality of a human person could be limit-
ed to the physical organism of that person. "On the contrary," she says, 
"Catholic teaching does in fact provide a strong basis for describing 
human personhood as a totality which is essentially constituted by the 
integration of both physical and spiritual aspects."51 And she adds a fur-
ther quotation from Pius XII referring to "the subordination of the 
organism itself to the spiritual end of the person." 
Given this understanding of what a human person is, it seems clear 
that physical death, the death of the biological organism, need not be 
construed as the summum malum, the worst thing that can happen to a 
person.52 Nor, given the Christian understanding of the destiny (or pos-
sible destiny) of human beings-"the resurrection of the body and the 
life everlasting" -should biological death be thought of as an event 
which precludes the possibility of any further good. So Cahill observes 
that 
life is for [a Christian] never an absolute value, to be salvaged at 
all costs. Sometimes continued life does not constitute a good for a 
certain individual because it cannot offer him the conditions of 
meaningful personal existence. Sometimes the continued life of an 
individual is incompatible with the preservation of other values 
which also claim protection.53 
And so she concludes that 
Since the distinctive and controlling element of human nature is 
the personal self or spirit, then according to the principle of totali-
ty, the body which is a "part" may in some cases be sacrificed for 
the good of the "whole" body-soul entity. Even direct intervention 
as a final option will not necessarily entail diminishing communal 
protectiveness toward human life's sanctity, if death is encom-
passed reluctantly and with a profound (and Christian) reverence 
for the personal existence within which it is an event.54 
Cahill's argument seems to me to be fundamentally Thomistic in 
character. It appeals to basic Thomistic principles-a base-line pre-
sumption which is "pro-life" (Cahill's "human life's sanctity"), a teleo-
logical over-rider, and the part/whole hierarchy in which the whole 
takes precedence over the part. But she comes to a conclusion opposite 
to that of Thomas and of Bernardin. She defends the possibility of 
morally licit suicide (and apparently of positive euthanasia also). Where 
does she differ from Thomas and Bernardin? 
Putting her argument in the context of Bernardin's argument, I take 
her to be denying Bernardin's assumption that every suicide assaults an 
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innocent life. (In this she agrees with Thomas.) To be more exact, she 
would deny this assumption if "innocent" is to be taken in what I now 
understand as the Thomistic sense, that of "harmless." For she holds 
that in some cases the biological life is so corrupted by disease, pain, 
debility, dementia, etc., that it is no longer an arena for spiritual growth. 
The biological life is no longer harmless to the person who is living it. In 
such a case the principle of totality allows-indeed, it may demand-the 
sacrifice of this part of one's whole life for the good of that larger whole 
of which it is a part." 
In the context of Thomas' general treatment of the morality of homicide, 
Cahill can be understood as proposing a broader-based teleology than he 
appears there to allow. She insists on considering not only the good of the 
political community of which the person is a member, but also the good of 
the person himself or herself. And she insists on taking account of the 
whole Christian conception of that good, including the spiritual dimen-
sion, the relationship with God, and the life of the world to come. 
Well, where does that leave us? It seems to me that Bernardin's line 
of argument does not fare well when we look at it closely. Thomas was 
well advised to steer clear of it, and to cast about for other reasons to 
reject suicide. And Bernardin's argument is unsatisfactory on both inter-
pretations of innocence. 
If we understand innocence in the foreboding sense, then Bernardin's 
argument fails because there are cases of suicide in which the life which 
is taken is not innocent. It has become so corrupted and debased-by 
pain, disease, debility, or etc.-that it has become harmful to the person 
who is living it. It is no longer an arena for the growth of a spiritual life, 
and is perhaps even a positive threat to that spiritual Iife. 5h That is the 
thrust of Cahill's argument. It seems highly persuasive. 
On the juridical interpretation, on the other hand, Bernardin's second 
premiss falls prey to the counter-example which Thomas himself cites. 
Some suicides really are guilty of (other) capital crimes. I suppose that 
someone might reply that this is a minor exception-there are going to 
be only a few such cases-and so we might salvage a slightly more mod-
est prohibition covering almost all suicides. That may be so, so far as it 
goes. But the juridical interpretation generates a deeper problem, that of 
providing a moral justification for Bernardin's first premiss, his princi-
ple, when it is understood in this way. Why should we suppose that it 
must always be illegitimate to assault a life which is juridically innocent? 
This question can be usefully discussed in connection with a further 
interpretive suggestion which we have not canvassed so far. This is the 
suggestion that we should construe innocence as a sort of combination 
of juridical and foreboding elements. 57 Perhaps, that is, we should think 
of the innocence principle as requiring that no human being be inten-
tionally killed unless he or she is non-innocent in both the juridical and 
the foreboding sense. 
I don't know whether this can be sustained as a viable interpretation 
of Thomas, especially in view of Jonsen's observations about the mean-
ing of the corresponding Latin term.58 But it is an interesting suggestion 
which can be considered in its own right. It is attractive because the 
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inclusion of juridical non-innocence alleviates some of the moral qualms 
which we may feel over the proposal that someone might be executed 
solely because he or she posed a threat to the community, even if that 
threat were not the result of any moral fault of their own.59 
The killing of someone who was juridically non-innocent might be 
justified on a retributive theory of punishment. The killing of someone 
who was forebodingly non-innocent might be justified on a consequen-
tialist theory of morality. How might one rationalize the view that nei-
ther of these justifications is sufficient by itself, but that some combina-
tion of them is? Well, here is at least one possible way. 
Suppose we hold that each person, originally at least, is endowed 
with a right to life, a right which is so strong that no possible teleological 
considerations can over-ride it. And so, for example, no good which 
might be conferred on the community, and no harm which might be 
averted, no matter how great, would justify the deliberate killing of a 
juridically innocent child. Suppose also that we hold that this right can 
be forfeited by the commission of certain serious crimes and/or sins. A 
person who commits such an act becomes juridically non-innocent, and 
no longer has the right to life. The killing of such a person would then 
not be a violation of the original right to life. That right has now been 
lost. And so the previous absolute barrier against the killing of that per-
son would now have disappeared. 
But suppose that we also hold that the mere fact that a certain act 
would not be a violation of a right is not a sufficient reason for doing 
that act. A full and satisfactory rationale for the performance of an act 
must also, or at least normally, include a teleological element-that the 
act will generate some good or forestall some evil. But if there is a posi-
tive rationale of that sort, and if the act does not violate a right, then the 
act can properly be done. Perhaps indeed there is a duty to do it. 
The combination of these three assumptions, then-a dominating 
"original" right to life, a forfeiture of that right because of juridical non-
innocence, and a positive rationale for killing based on foreboding non-
innocence-that combination seems to provide a framework in which 
both sorts of non-innocence would be necessary for justified killing, nei-
ther would by itself be sufficient, and their combination would be (or 
might be) sufficient. 
Understood in this way, this proposal seems to rehabilitate juridical 
innocence as a barrier to the legitimacy of homicide, and so as a barrier 
to the legitimacy of suicide. But it also suggests a way of circumventing 
the latter barrier. For this proposal appeals to the idea of a right, a right 
which cannot legitimately be violated. But this right can be lost, forfeit-
ed, by certain actions. Yes, no doubt rights can be forfeited. But rights 
can also be waived. I own the house where I live. No doubt I have some 
right of privacy there, some right (moral, or legal, or both) to exclude 
certain persons from entering my house. Burglars, breaking and enter-
ing, would violate that right. But I can myself waive that right, choosing 
not to exercise it, not to assert it in some particular case. So if strangers 
come to my door I may invite them to come in, even if they otherwise 
would have no right to enter. And if they act on my invitation, then 
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they do not violate my right to privacy. 
A juridically innocent person may indeed have a right to life, perhaps 
a right so strong that no consequentialist consideration could override it. 
But that person may waive his or her right to life. And presumably sui-
cidal persons do waive that right (if they have it), since they actively 
undertake to kill themselves.60 Suicidal people may indeed be doing 
something wrong. But it seems implausible to suppose that the wrong 
they are doing is that of violating their own right to life. That would be 
rather like thinking that I could violate my own right to privacy by invit-
ing strangers to come to my house. 
Voluntarily waiving one's right to life is not the same as forfeiting 
that right by crime or sin. In the latter case one would become juridical-
ly non-innocent, and therefore a plausible candidate for punishment. 
But waiving one's right would not make one juridically non-innocent. 
The killing of such a person would remain inappropriate as a 
punishment. It could not be rationalized in terms of retribution. But it 
might be open to a teleological rationale. 
Some people who commit suicide may intend to punish themselves 
for some evil, whether real or imagined. If in fact they have not commit-
ted any relevant evil, or if their evil is not so serious as to merit this pun-
ishment, then their reason for committing suicide is mistaken. And 
maybe the suicide itself, based on a false reason, is morally iIlicit. 61 But 
most people who commit suicide do not intend to punish themselves. 
Many of them, in fact, intend to do something good-either something 
good for themselves, or something good for someone else, or both. And 
some of them may indeed be doing one or both of these kinds of good. 
Whatever we may think of the propriety of suicide in the end, there is no 
reason to think of it generally in terms of retribution. It is not usually 
an exercise in punishment, either rightly or wrongly. 
I conclude, therefore, that the Bernardin line of argument, with its 
appeal to the innocence of suicide candidates, fails if innocence is con-
strued in the juridical sense, or in the foreboding sense, or in a combina-
tion of these senses. There are, of course, other arguments which have 
been given against the morality of suicide, including those of Thomas. I 
do not speak of those here. But, it seems to me, we can at least set aside 
the line of argument to which Cardinal Bernardin, and perhaps many 
others, have been attracted. 
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